It is equally interesting to see how someone like Henderson can continue to maintain the narrow Orientalist lens that events over the last few months should have dispelled. Henderson continues to claim that the main fault lines that exist in the Middle East are between Sunni and Shia, moderate Muslim and extremist, Jew and Arab, etc,. Henderson nowhere mentions workers, women, youth, professionals, or socialists and liberals in his one-dimensional and by now woefully inadequate representation of the people of the Middle East. In doing so, Henderson not only misunderstands the Middle East (which any second year ME studies student would appreciate) but be fails to grasp the meaning of the popular struggle that has sent shock waves through the last bastion of Cold War authoritarianism.

Not only is Henderson unable to perceive the complexity and secularity of the Middle East he is unable to see the contradiction in his argument. While I think Pilger’s position vis-à-vis the condition of the Middle East can be one-dimensional, Henderson’s criticism of Pilger’s position is hugely problematic. On the one hand, Henderson says that Pilger’s assessment of the “western” interference Middle East politics is a leftist conspiracy but then quotes Condoleezza Rice’s own self-reflections of the US support for Middle East dictators which she acknowledges has been to the detriment of democratic movements.  Henderson’s article has other glaring errors. His assessment of democracy in Iraq is simplistic to say the least. The notion that somehow Israel is on the sidelines is a throw-away comment from this conservative commentator that serves no purpose other than to deflect attention from the central part that Israel plays in Middle East politics. But then, this was the point of the article after all. The ultimate game for Henderson and other conservatives is to make the facile point again and again that somehow Israel is not a part of the greater Middle East. News for you Gerard, Israel is as much a part of the Middle East as Iran and Turkey, and it’s only when the Israeli government and their supporters, and  more Arabs come to this realisation that genuine progress towards peace will be possible.

Noah Bassil

The first of these myths to be exposed as bogus, is the widespread belief in the inertia of the Arab masses. If the images of the Tunisian people’s challenges to the authoritarian regime of Ben Ali were not enough evidence of the political power of Arab societies then the scenes of millions of Egyptians, women and men, challenging Hosni Mubarak’s right to rule should dispel any misconceptions that Arabs are bound by a tradition of fatalism and despotism. Libyan, Bahraini, Moroccan and Yemeni protestors only serve to further wipe away the idea that the Middle East is unchanging and historically static.

Secondly, the idea that Islamists monopolise political opposition in the Middle East is impossible to sustain in the face of the secularism on display in Cairo, Tangiers and Benghazi. However, many reporters and Middle East “experts” seem to remain wedded to the notion that behind every event in the Arab world lurks the evil hand of radical Islamists. This notion should now be put to rest as Arab secular voices have not only drowned out the Islamists but shown the lack of relevance of Muslim politics in the shaping of the protesters demands. These secular voices have called for social justice, employment, food, and an end to the regimes corrupt activities, including privatization, austerity programs and the dismantling of the welfare states. It was jobs and dignity that drove people to the streets definitely not shar’ia or holy war.

Thirdly, the belief that “western” approval for the policies of Arab leaders automatically translates into popular appeal can no longer be taken for granted. While Arab dictators such as Ben Ali and Mubarak were popular in the White House, London, Paris and the IMF, events of the last two months have shown how despised they were in their own countries. The fate of Colonel Gaddafi now rests with his own people and not with allies in London, Rome or Washington. It should now be clear that supporting policies that promote the interests of western powers and international investors might bring Arab leaders international approval, but that such policies are highly unpopular at home and be the cause of mass uprisings such as those we have witnessed over the last month. International stability comes at a price and the Arab masses are demanding payment.

Fourth, there must no longer be serious doubts about claims of the “trickle down” associated with economic liberalisation in countries like Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Sudan, Lebanon and Jordan. The countries that have experienced the largest, and angriest, mass protests have been exactly those countries that have followed the advice of the IMF most closely and received the highest acclaim from international financial institutions and the leading proponents of market fundamentalism in the developing world, namely the U.S. and the EU. Tunisian and Egyptian unemployment and poverty rates are startling when held up against the praise that these two countries have received for their economic management.  Clearly, its time to move beyond the idea that economic growth alone can address issues of poverty and underdevelopment.

Holding these myths, and others I haven’t had time to explore, up to scrutiny at this critical time, will not only show that the Arab people only seek to share the same democratic and human rights that we dearly protect, but also provide political space for “us” to rethink our own conceptualizations of the region and its people, and in doing so, dismantle the artificial barriers that so often it is believed have come to exist between Arabs and the “west”.  Tearing down this barrier will allow Arab voices into global discourses on human rights, democracy, social justice and gender rights enriching the lives of Arab people and also will enrich those discourses as well. It is this aspect of the recent events that have rocked the Middle East that will have greatest impact.

Noah Bassil

What events in Tunisia and Egypt is clearly showing is that this threat holds a significant place in the western imaginary of the Middle East, as much as camels, flying carpets and harems. This despite the reality that it has not been Islamists who have dominated the scenes in Tunis and Cairo.One journalist who has picked up on the weakness of radical Islam in the Middle East is Paul McGeough (http://www.smh.com.au/world/alqaeda-lost-on-the-arab-street-20110204-1aguj.html).  And despite my general agreement  with Paul MacGeough’s overall argument that current Middle East protests show how much ground Islamists have lost amongst the youth in the Middle East, I think that his assertion that youth have chosen Ipods, Starbucks and McDonald’s over Islamic terrorism may technically be correct but still far short of the reality. Sure, young people in Tahrir Square prefer surfing the net to strapping themselves with explosives and bringing down a airliner, or a Big Mac to beheading  unbelievers, but this doesn’t tell us much at all. Rather, what we should be examining is the slogans of the protesters, and in the void that is often called journalism not much of this has been done in the reporting over Tunisia and more recently, Egypt.

So fascinated is the western media with the Islamist angle that they have all but missed the undercurrent of the pan-Arab nationalism which has been at the forefront of the protesters banners and chants. They have missed that what people in the Middle East are protesting for is not for their states to vanish, as wishful conservative and neo-liberal advocates would want, but that they want their states to protect them from the inequality and alienation that the market creates.  Tunisia and Egypt are certainly not Islamist revolutions, but they maybe somewhat red in colour, at least “red”  in the sense of the social democratic principles of the 1960s and of the era of Nasserism.

While the west focuses on the illusion of Islamism, something potentially more dangerous to the post Cold War Pax Americana is emerging from Tunis and Cairo.  This Pax American which has been based on free market fundamentalism and on the ideal that social welfare and distributing wealth should be the responsibility of markets and not of governments is under siege from a number of directions and the Arab uprisings add another volatile front in the struggle against US imperialism in the form of neo-liberalism.

These are very exciting times, not only because of the monumental changes that have resulted from the forced resignations of two of the world’s longest serving dictators, both very close allies of the supposedly pro-democracy “west”, but because the Arab revolutions are symbolic of the mounting global resistance to a system that promotes inequality, alienation, and marginalisation. Freedom is the only promise that neo-liberalism has delivered to most people around the world, that is a freedom to be unemployed, hungry and homeless. For the revolutionaries of Tahrir Square the revolution begins not with overthrowing Mubarak but with unravelling the “economic miracle” (IMF actually awarded Egypt with the title of the best reforming economy in the world) that has left 40% of Egyptians earning less than $2 a day. Time will tell how much reform of the neo-liberal economy Mubarak’s successors will allow but irrespective of what happens in the coming days, weeks and months in Egypt, the winds of change are blowing, and the struggle for social democracy has begun.

Noah Bassil

The most common comparisons of the Jasmine Revolution that I’ve read in the press have been with the Iranian anti-Ahmadinejad protests in 2009 and Ukraine’s 2004 Orange Revolution. Such comparisons risk oversimplifying and mistaking the purpose and cause of the Jasmine Revolution which differs from the others in a number of significant ways. Above all, the differences are based on the levels of politicisation and the demands being made by the protestors. On this basis, it can be argued that Tunisia 2011 has more in common with the 1979 Iranian Revolution that brought down the Shah than with the more recent popular protests in Iran or the Ukraine. Let me explain.

Inconvenient as it might be, the reality about the 2009 post-election protesters in Iran was that, on the whole, they were not trying to topple the Islamist state. The dissent focused on the manipulation of election results that kept Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in power. While there were certainly some elements amongst the protesters that wanted to overthrow the theocratic system, most of the Iranians on the streets of Tehran were reformists rather than revolutionaries. Likewise, the Ukrainian protesters sought electoral accountability rather than revolutionary change.

Events in Tunisia, though, are far more revolutionary in nature and the protesters seek large political and economic changes beyond the removal of the Tunisian President Zine El Abidine Ben-Ali and his cronies from power; not unlike the demands of anti-Shah protests in Iran during 1978. This is obvious from the way that events have unfolded in Tunisia. Ben-Ali’s initial use of violence towards the protesters was spectacularly unsuccessful.  His next move, to promise future reform, also did nothing to dampen the anger on the street, leaving him with no alternative but to flee Tunisia. All of this is very reminiscent of the last days of the Shah’s regime some thirty years ago. In both cases, the regimes, and what they represented, were so widely despised that rehabilitation had become impossible.

Events in Tunisia over the last month have come as a surprise to most observers even though the country has been a powder-keg waiting to explode for some time. Escalating food prices combined with high levels of unemployment have taken place against a backdrop of uneasy calm and the seemingly entrenched leadership of Ben-Ali. However, once the protests began, twenty-three years in power were pushed aside in a matter of weeks. The Iranian Shah also ruled for over two decades and his regime seemed fundamentally strong but was overthrown in a matter of weeks.

Like the Shah, Ben-Ali was a close US ally and had worked in partnership with the EU and the IMF. In recent years, Tunisia has been hailed as an ‘economic miracle’ based on the precision with which the structural adjustments demanded by the IMF had been implemented. However, the “miracle” came at a cost typical of neoliberalism. The privatisation of the economy resulted in the shedding of state jobs, the elimination of import restrictions decimated local industries, and the removal of subsidies on food and other staples sent prices soaring.

The Shah was also said to have overseen an economic miracle of his own but, as with Tunisia, the policies supporting the miracle exacerbated the existing inequalities, enriching a small elite at the expense of the living standards of the general population. While corruption has played an important part in the high levels of economic impoverishment experienced in Tunisia, at a deeper level the tone of the protests call into question the entire neo-liberal program.

In the 1960s and 1970s, the fear of communism was at the forefront of US geopolitics. In this context, the Shah’s strong anti-communism made him a necessary ally of the US, even as they had full knowledge of the brutality of the Iranian state at this time. The Shah’s secret police, SAVAK, routinely practised abduction, torture, and murder, and had close links to the CIA.

Since 2001, it has been the “war on terror” and Islamic extremism which has characterised US international relations. In this context, Tunisia assumed an important role as a US ally. With the US and EU governments conveniently ignoring his human rights abuses,  Ben-Ali fashioned a police force that routinely employed tactics much like those used by the SAVAK: torture and murder included. However, the US-Iranian alliance, didn’t save the Shah or his regime from political oblivion, and neither has Ben-Ali been saved by his western friends.

The main question now is whether the US and, in this case the EU will intervene to protect their interests in Tunisia or allow the will of the Tunisian people to speak. If they embark the first course of action and fail then they risk losing the moderate voices in Tunisia to more extremist politics. While only time will tell how events unfold, in the meantime, to do justice to the Tunisian Revolutionaries it is important that we don’t mistakenly identify the colour of the Tunisian Revolution with the Green or Orange of other recent popular protests. In correctly identifying the colour of the Jasmine Revolution we go some way to comprehending the significance of the potential changes we are witnessing.

Noah Bassil

In more recent days, though, the Sudan has been experiencing the same level of popular discontent with the ruling party that we have witnessed in Tunisia and Egypt. The difference in Sudan, and especially for Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir, is that unlike Ben-Ali and Hosni Mubarak, his international standing is poor to say the least. He is the only serving international leader to be indicted by the International Criminal Court and amongst European leaders in particular is persona non gratis. As his position in Sudan worsens, he will not be able to call on his international friends to support his government in the same way that the Egyptian President has been able to do over the last week. Support for al-Bashir will not be coming as readily as it has for the Egyptian President because the fear of instability in Sudan does not worry the US or the EU anywhere as much as it does in the case of Egypt. This raises the question of how serious are the protests that have broken out in Sudan and are they strong enough to bring down a regime that has been in power for over two decades?

Of this I am still somewhat uncertain, but it can be said that al-Bashir is weaker now than at any other time over the last decade, at least since the very public internal conflict within the ruling party in 1999 that resulted in the purge of Hasan al-Turabi and his supporters and paved the way for the peace deal between the Sudanese government and the southern Sudan. The culmination of this process is the above-mentioned separation of the north and the south which is highly unpopular in the northern Sudan and has been one of the issues that protesters have been referring to in the recent outbreaks of unrest. Opponents of the peace deal, such as Hasan al-Turabi, have called for the president to stand down and follow the lead of Tunisia’s Ben-Ali. This public criticism of Omar al-Bashir has earned Turabi another stint in jail which for the elderly Islamist leader will only serve to increase his popularity amongst some segments of the protesters. Whether the protests intend to replace Omar al-Bashir with his former bed-fellow in government is unlikely as the popular mood seems to be mirroring that in Tunisia and Egypt for more drastic changes than just the return of past political leaders.

While, the popular mood is for change, the past has some relevance, certainly Omar al-Bashir will be aware of the power of the Sudanese people. Before Ben-Ali’s dramatic fall from power, Sudan was the last country in the Middle East where the popular will successfully challenged an incumbent government. In 1985, mass protests on the street of Khartoum combined with a general strike led to the fall of Jaafar Nimeiri. Prior to this, Sudanese popular protests brought down the military regime of General Abboud in 1964. The Sudanese people are very proud of this tradition and in the current moment of protests seem to be buoyed by references to the successes of the past. They must be wary though, for al-Bashir is in one way much stronger than both his ousted predecessors who were fighting wars in the southern Sudan at the time they were forced from office. This time, the Sudanese miltiary can focus on buttressing the President and protecting the regime, a luxury they did not have in either 1985 or 1964.

And it is the role of the southern Sudan that may prove to be the basis for the biggest irony, even if no-one is laughing, of the political situation as it pans out. If al-Bashir is saved by the military, then it might be the peace in the southern Sudan which proved crucial for defeating the uprising. If, on the other hand he goes, then it might be the anger in the northern Sudan towards the secession of the south that overwhelms the regime. Either way, the future of Sudan is very unstable and the possibility that al-Bashir may be the next Arab dictator to flee the ire of the people is very real.

Noah Bassil

How New is the Southern Sudan?

There is little doubt that in July of this year a new state will join the international system. This state will be greeted with much fanfare from western sponsors who have robustly supported a process of independence for the Southern Sudan. Before analysing some of the issues that might belie the euphoria surrounding the creation of this state, I’ll make a few preliminary comments that will demonstrate that I am no apologist for either the artificially constructed territories that Africa was saddled with at independence or the successive Khartoum governments that have largely been responsible for years of north-south conflict and national instability that followed the end of formal European colonialism in Africa.

The boundaries of modern African states, with a few exceptions, result from European rivalries and expansion in the late nineteenth century. Sudan is an excellent example of how this process unfolded. Kitchener’s victory of Omdurman in 1898 secured Sudan for Britain and more importantly ensured British control of Egypt and the hence the Suez Canal. In fact, for a number of key scholars, including historian M.W. Daly, author of the monumental two volume history of colonial Sudan , British interest in the Sudan was first and foremost determined by the influence that control of the Nile gave them over Egypt. This was equally true in 1956 when Sudan attained independence as it was in 1898 when Kitchener’s forces destroyed the Sudanese army and marched into Khartoum. Actually, most states in Africa (and for that matter in the Middle East and Asia) can be said to have been the result of nineteenth century imperial politics, and even if the imperial legacy is a distasteful subject for some people, there is no doubting the reality that the Sudanese dilemma has it roots in the way that the British, French, and Belgians carved up Africa.

So, the vast majority of states in Africa are artificial. They were born not of organic state and nation- building such as was the case in Europe in the eighteenth and nineteenth century and neither were they extensions of those European societies in the way that settler societies such as Australia and Canada were. Rather, the boundaries were drawn by European politicians, merchants, explorers and missionaries without any input from the people who would become Sudanese, Kenyans, Nigerians, Angolans, etc. Overcoming this legacy requires, as it would seem, a redrawing of the map of Africa to allow for political units to emerge represented the culture, geography, history, and economic efficiencies that were all ignored by colonialism. In this way, it seems, that the separation of southern Sudan is a necessary step in this process of overcoming the territorial problems created by colonialism. Unfortunately, the problem is not so easily solved. Why?

Firstly, the southern Sudan is as artificial a construct as the larger territory we all knew as the Sudan. The South Sudan is a conglomerate of a number of independent political groups which were only united by their opposition to Khartoum. That the common enemy is now external, and somewhat removed from the internal politics of the southern Sudan will turn the spotlight back on the different actors and interests that make up the SPLM. Already, there have been signs that the SPLM leadership is divided on the fundamentals of the new state. The last time this occurred was in the 1990s and the result was a protracted and bloody inter-party struggle which only worked to Khartoum’s benefit. Khartoum, once again, will be hoping that it will be able to manipulate the internal divisions within the SPLM to its own advantage in the negotiations over key economic and political issues which still need to take place before any separation is formalised. The tensions within the SPLM remain one of the major challenges that the southern Sudan faces and may prove more dangerous than any of the issues that remain to be settled with the northern Sudan. The SPLM’s military wing, the Southern People’s Liberation Army or SPLA remains heavily armed with many of the fighters still in control of their weapons and answerable, not to the civilian administration that is formed, but to their military commanders. There is a possibility for these soldiers to resist unpopular political decisions including what will be a tricky process of decommissioning and disarming the SPLA. Also, there is the issue of military commanders relinquishing their authority to the civilian administration resulting in these war time commanders losing control of the resources from which their positions of power are based. At both these levels, the leaders of the southern Sudan will have to tread lightly or face a potential uprising or uprisings of their own making.

The disunity of the SPLM is only really a reflection of the disunity of the southern Sudan more broadly. What will become the sovereign state of the Southern Sudan will be as diverse as any other African country with numerous ethnic groups that have had long histories of independence and a history of a colonial system of administration that institutionalised ethnic differences and political separation. Fifty-five years of independence has done little to overcome this history and construct some sense of national unity. This means that in many ways the newest African state will share some of the fundamental weaknesses of many of its neighbours. The fear expressed by some in the region is that the splitting of the Sudan into two separate states will only result in two weak and failed states in the region rather than one. Whether this occurs or not is uncertain, but for the moment, there is still time for a certain optimism that the Southern Sudan can overcome the legacies of the past and fashion a brighter future.

Noah Bassil

Even if the fleet to Gaza is irritating and outrageous, a sovereign state cannot treat every act of protest as a terror event that has to end in bloodshed

Tonight Israel marked a new low point in the way it chose to contend with its domestic and external policy dissidents. A state that will not let its citizens protest, demonstrate and demand justice, a state that is busy composing loyalty tests for its citizens and passing laws to limit the freedom of expression, failed again in the real test and stopped a protest fleet of civilian ships at the cost of more than ten lives.

The fleet that left Turkey a few days ago managed to anger even me. Hundreds of pro-Hamas activists challenged Israel blatantly and outrageously. Not a word of censure of the Hamas government, not a word about Gilad Shalit and not a word about the desire for peace. Nonetheless, a sovereign state cannot treat every show of protest, however outrageous and irritating it is, as a terror event that has to end in bloodshed. Instead of using the fleet to generate an internal Israeli discussion about the effectiveness of the policy of the siege of Gaza and its moral and political implications for Israel, all of the government spokesmen chose to focus on the handful of activists on the ships and grace them with the title of existential threats to Israel’s security. From here to unnecessary bloodshed the path was short.

It is not the soldiers’ fault, nor the commanders’ nor the heads of the IDF’s. Israeli society as a whole is responsible for the grim results of the IDF takeover of the protest ships. The radicalization of Israeli society is yielding its fruit. The message to the soldiers and police is crystallizing. When Arabs are involved in an activity, the hand on the trigger is light. Determination boards the ship while sensitivity stays in the water.

But have no fear, the domestic Israeli propaganda machine began to work and in just a few hours every Israeli will be recounting how Hamas helicopters took over a Jewish ship and shot illegal immigrants in all directions. With the use of our repression mechanisms and the encouragement of the IDF spokesman we will again dissociate from reality and the world and manufacture our own unique script in which we are the victims and the whole world is against us as usual. Will the outcome of tonight’s confrontation end with an official commission of inquiry? No chance.

Israel justifies its brutal and violent image

The price for the unfortunate results of the fleet will be paid primarily by the families of those who were killed at sea last night. Next in line to pay the price will be the residents of Israel who want peace and the end of the conflict with all their hearts, and who wish to stop the cycle of bloodshed and live in a saner country. We, the silent majority, watch with despair as Israel with its own actions justifies the brutal and violent image it acquired in the last years and gives our biggest enemies in Hamas and Iran a reason to rejoice.

If the miserable naval clash had any winners, they are in Tehran, in the bunkers of Beirut and in the Hamas headquarters in Gaza. The Hamas government succeeded with the Israeli government’s active support to receive international recognition, to gain the support of the Arab world and to be seen as a hero standing up to Israel.

The enemies of peace and the extremists on both sides can again find reasons to attack each other and deepen the hatred and hostility between Jews and Arabs in Israel and outside of it. Again the moderates on both sides are silenced and the voice of reason is drowned out by the voices of incitement and hatred. Without a loud voice of protest by a patriotic Israeli public calling on its leaders to change course, we will all find ourselves in a morally and politically decadent country, slowly sinking into the depths.

Appreciation to Sol Salbe from ME News Service who provided the link (http://www.peacenow.org.il/site/en/peace.asp?pi=195&fld=694&docid=4675) to access this piece.

So, if the war is not about being Arab or African, what is it about? This is a complex question and a question partially answered by studies such as Flint and De Waal (2007), Daly (2007) and Mamdani (2009). While these studies allude to the problem of the Sudan’s failed politics and failing state, none of them go far enough in laying the balance of the blame for events in Darfur on the incapacity of the Sudanese state and the problems that accrue from a state that is ineffective and from a government that is unable to act except in the interests of a narrow ruling elite. Sudan’s economic crisis began with independence and became even worse after the global recession of the 1970s. By the 1980s, Sudan was a major defaulter of loan repayments and was only propped up by the US and the IMF because of its strategic importance in fighting communism in Africa. With the end of the cold war and the rise of an anti-US Islamist government in the 1990s, Sudan’s economic crisis worsened and Sudan was, and remains, the only country expelled from the IMF for non-compliance. In the 1990s, the Sudan was a basket-case and the state fell into complete ruin. The result of this was that the people of Darfur received very little from the Sudanese government and in 2003 rebelled in the hope of securing access to some state resources and funds. The rebellion turned into a civil war and the civil war turned into a humanitarian crisis.

So, from this brief outline it is clear that the best way to deal with the crisis in the Sudan is to assist in rebuilding the capacity of the Sudanese state, especially in Darfur where access to medical care, education and employment are urgently required. This would require the assistance of international financial institutions and the members of the G8/G20. What then does the Save Darfur Coalition recommend for ending the crisis in Darfur?

“Save Darfur Coalition Asks G-20 Not to Forgive Sudan’s Debt”

Who would benefit from such a move? The people of Darfur or International creditors and the IMF? We all want the crisis in Darfur to come to an end and for people to be able to return to their homes and to be able to start to rebuild their lives. The most effective way to achieve this is by investing in a strong and stable Sudanese state that can provide its population with employment, education, health care and security. The Save Darfur Coalition and other organisations of similar ilk have missed the point all together on Darfur, and cannot come to terms with the reality that the best way of resolving the crisis is by rebuilding Sudan and not by punishing the Sudanese which only end up punishing the people of Darfur because after all Darfur is a part of the Sudan. Until Save Darfur see this basic fact they will never really understand what the crisis in Darfur is truly about or how to resolve it.

Noah Bassil

Iraqi Women Speak Out
ProductionYear: 2006
Runtime: 16:30
Producers: Brian Drolet

In March 2006, Code Pink invited eight Iraqi women to the U.S. to speak about their experiences under U.S. invasion and occupation. Two of the women had their entire families killed by U.S. troops. They were denied visas on the grounds they did not have sufficient family to guarantee they would return to Iraq.

See http://deepdishtv.org/ProgramDetail/Default.aspx?id=3262 for more details about the documentary.

–L.L. Wynn